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Jurisdiction Under the Sherman Act: A Close Look at
the Affects Test
Congress passed the Sherman Act,' prohibiting contracts,
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, pursuant to its
power under the commerce clause of the United States Constitution.2 The United States Supreme Court has determined that Congress intended jurisdiction under the Act to be coextensive with
that of the commerce clauseA Sherman Act jurisdiction is therefore
as broad as Congress' commerce power, 4 but no broader. 5 The
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982). Section 1 provides: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .... " For a discussion of
the legislative history of the Sherman Act, see E. KiNTNER, 1 FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 125243 (1980).
2 See notes 9-10 infra.
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 241 (1980); see note
5 infra. The Clayton Act and the Robinson-Patman Act, unlike the Sherman Act, are not
jurisdictionally coextensive with the commerce power. The Supreme Court found that the
distinct "in" commerce language of the former two Acts precluded the Court from exercising "affects" jurisdiction. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974).
4 Under the Sherman Act, "commerce" is almost any intercourse or activity. Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). See, e.g.,Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde,
104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984) (medical services); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773
(1975) (legal services); United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955) (theatrical entertainment); United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952) (patent transaction); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (distribution services); United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (insurance transaction); Costello
Publishing Co. v. Rotelle, 670 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (religious liturgical literature);
Bain v. Henderson, 621 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1980) (interstate criminal activity). However,
some business activities are curiously not considered "commerce" under the Sherman Act.
See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (baseball is not commerce); Carpenters Local
Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 532 (5th Cir. 1982) (union representation is not a commercial activity), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 942 (1983); Local Union 808,
Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. P & W R.R., 576 F. Supp. 693, 697 (D. Conn. 1983)
(human labor is not an article of commerce); Kalmanovitz v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 576
F. Supp. 922, 928-29 (D. Del. 1983) (a transaction of the stock of a single corporation is not
commerce).
5 444 U.S. at 241 (1980). See also United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n,
322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944) ("That Congress wanted to go to the utmost extent of its Constitutional power in [the Sherman Act] . . . admits of little, if any doubt."); Note, McLain v.
Real Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc., 11 ENVT'L L. 161 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note,
McLain] (citing 21 CONG. REC. 3147, 6341 (1890) (Sen. George and Rep. Stewart stated
that the Sherman Act was intended to cover everything the Constitution gave Congress the
power to regulate under the commerce power)). Although the Court had divided the Sherman Act into substantive and jurisdictional language in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310
U.S. 469, 494-95 (1939), see also Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517, 521-22
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973), this understanding of a dichotomized Sherman
§ I may no longer be valid. In Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738,
742 n.1 (1976), the Court asserted that a challenge based on a plaintiffs failure to show a
nexus to interstate commerce can come equally under either a 12(b)(1) (lack of subject
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commerce clause determines the constitutional limits ofjurisdiction
under the Sherman Act.
Recently, however, lower federal courts have encountered difficulties in determining the parameters of Sherman Act jurisdiction.
In McLain v. Real Estate Board,6 the Supreme Court attempted to
clarify the most troublesome jurisdictional standard of Shermanthe "affects" test.7 Unfortunately, McLain created even greater
matter jurisdiction) or a 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim) motion. This implies that the
interstate commerce nexus is both a substantive and a jurisdictional requirement. Aside
from the real differences between the two motions, compare Mortensen v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977); Comment, Expanding FederalAntitrust
Jurisdiction: A Close Look at McLain v. Real Estate Bd. Inc., 19 Hous. L. REV. 143, 169-71
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment, FederalAntitrustJurisdiction];with McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 583 F.2d 1315, 1324 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 444 U.S. 232 (1980);
Englert v. McKeesport, 736 F.2d 96, 98-99 (3d Cir. 1984), there is also a constitutional
difficulty in unifying the language. Either the court has subject matter jurisdiction, in which
case a 12(b)(1) motion is inapplicable, and the court should proceed to the merits, see Note,
Sherman Act 'Jurisdiction" in Hospital Staff Exclusion Cases, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 121 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Hospital Stafli; cf. P. AREEDA, ANrITRUST LAw 232.1, at 97-99 (Supp.
1982) (article III of the Constitution is not limited by a requirement of interstate commerce, but the practice of considering it as a jurisdictional issue is firmly entrenched), or
else the court has no subject matter jurisdiction and therefore has no power to hear the
merits of the case. In the latter case a 12(b)(6) motion would be constitutionally inappropriate. SeeApex, 310 U.S. at 483 ("[The federal courts'] only jurisdiction is to vindicate such
");AMcLain,
federal right as Congress has conferred on petitioner by the Sherman Act ..
583 F.2d at 1323; Englert, 736 F.2d at 98-99. The view that the courts have jurisdiction
unless the Act is unconstitutional on its face, see Note, Hospital Staff, at 127-29, misses the
fact that if the Act is unconstitutional as applied to the particular defendant, due to the defendant's lack of any nexus with interstate commerce, the court equally lacks jurisdiction.
Regardless of whether one views the interstate commerce requirement as jurisdictional or
substantive, it seems tautologically true that it cannot be equally both. But see Note, The
Interstate Commerce Test forJurisdictionin Sherman Act Cases and Its Substantive Implications, 15 GA.
L. REV. 714, 720-24 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Commerce Test]. Of course, the court
has jurisdiction to consider jurisdiction. See WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS 84-89
(1983).
6 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
7 The focus of this note is the "affects" test. The other jurisdictional test is the "in"
interstate commerce test. When determining which "activity" need be "in" interstate commerce, courts look to whether the alleged restraint is on some article of commerce that is
transported interstate. See Local 167, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 291
U.S. 293 (1934); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208
U.S. 274 (1908).
It is difficult to determine when goods are "in" interstate traffic. Early Supreme Court
precedent attempted to set limits for the beginning and end of an article's trip in interstate
commerce. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (an article is not "in"
interstate commerce until after manufacture, and the article actually begins its journey
across state lines); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 442 (1827) (an article is
not in interstate commerce once the original package is opened, originating the "come to
rest" doctrine which arose in the context of taxation. However, that doctrine might not
apply to cases of regulation, such as Sherman Act cases. See Katzenback v. McLung, 379
U.S. 294, 302 (1964)). Now, however, the very broad "flow of commerce" theory determines when an article begins or ends its trip in interstate commerce. Under this theory, ifa
product has been "in" the flow of commerce, the article is still in the stream of commerce
for Sherman Act jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347
U.S. 186 (1954) (plastering materials which had been in interstate commerce before being
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confusion, leaving the lower courts uncertain as to the method of
8
determining jurisdiction under the Sherman Act.
sold intrastate for intrastate construction are still within Sherman Act stream of commerce
jurisdiction); Local 167, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 291 U.S. 293
(1934) (poultry formerly sold interstate is still in the stream of commerce for Sherman Act
jurisdiction during later intrastate sales and distributions); Rasmussen v. American Dairy
Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517 (9th Cir.) (filled milk ingredients from out-of-state, shipped in-state,
mixed with in-state water, and sold wholly intrastate are still in stream of commerce), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973). Further, if a product will be "in" the flow, the article is already
in the stream of commerce for Sherman Actjurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. Women's
Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949) (the product from wholly intrastate stitchers
are "in" the flow of commerce to the extent that the clothes on which they work later travel
through another business into interstate commerce); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v.
American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948) (fact of chemical restructuring of beets
into sugar neither begins the sugar's trip nor ends the beets' trip in the stream of commerce); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (restraint on intrastate production of hats
ultimately destined for interstate market is "in" interstate commerce); Swift & Co. v. United
States, 196 U.S. 375, 398-99 (1905) (flow of meat interstate interrupted); United States v.
Azzarelli Constr. Co., 612 F.2d 292, 295-96 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 920 (1980)
(fact of chemical restructuring of restrained good does not interrupt the flow). See also
Gordon, Swift & Co. v. United States: The Beef Trust and the Stream of Commerce Doctrine, 28
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 244 (1984).
The Supreme Court further extended the "in" commerce jurisdiction of the Sherman
Act in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), holding that any activity which
was a "necessary and integral part" of an interstate transaction, even if otherwise wholly
intrastate, is "in" interstate commerce for the purposes of Sherman jurisdiction. Id. at 784.
Thus, an intrastate attorney title investigation, needed to secure title insurance, was a necessary and integral part of an interstate real estate transaction, and was therefore within
Sherman Act "in" commerce jurisdiction. See Bain v. Henderson, 621 F.2d 959, 960 (9th
Cir. 1980).
This "flow of commerce" theory raises the questions whether an article ever begins or
ends its trip in interstate commerce, and whether the stream of commerce has any limiting
shores. But, although defining the stream's limits would be helpful analytically, practically
speaking, the stream merely spills over into the "affects" test. See Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S.
320, 321 (1967); Employing PlasterersAss'n, 347 U.S. at 189 ("We are not impressed by the
argument that the Sherman Act could not possibly apply here because the interstate buying, selling and movement of plastering materials had ended before the local restraints
became effective. Where interstate commerce ends and local commerce begins is not always easy to decide and is not decisive in Sherman cases."); Local 167, 291 U.S. at 293
("[W]e need not decide when interstate commerce ends and that which is intrastate begins.
The control of the handling, the sales and.the prices at the place of origin before the interstate journey begins or in the State of destination where the interstate movement ends may
operate directly to restrain and monopolize interstate commerce."). Of course, this is not
altogether true because whether jurisdiction is based on a restraint being "in" commerce
rather than "affecting" commerce determines whether or not one need prove substantiality
of impact. See 444 U.S. at 246; Note, Antitrust Application of the Sherman Act to Local Real Estate
Brokerage Activites-McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc., 29 DE PAUL L. REV.
1063, 1066-67 (1980); Comment, FederalAntitrust Jurisdiction,supra note 5, at 159. See also
note 9 infra and accompanying text. Yet, this statement is practically true in that nearly any
impact is considered substantial; therefore, any restraint near enough to the shores of the
stream of commerce to slip into it analytically will necessarily have a substantial enough
impact. See also notes 68-72 infra and accompanying text.
8 The courts have dealt with this problem in varying ways. Aside from the four interpretations discussed in notes 30-45 infra and accompanying text, other responses include:
1) extensive discussion of the split of interpretations, followed by a refusal to choose between them, Tarleton v. Meharry Medical College, "717F.2d 1523, 1527-30, 1532 n.2 (6th
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This note analyzes the various interpretations of the "affects"
test following McLain and suggests an appropriate approach for
eliminating the confusion. Part I discusses the principal jurisdictional tests under the commerce clause. Part II analyzes the "affects" test for Sherman Act jurisdiction in light of McLain and sets
forth the courts of appeals' four interpretations of McLain. Finally,
part IV explains why the "particular enterprise" interpretation of
McLain's "affects" test best reflects the Sherman Act's full
jurisdiction.
I. Jurisdiction Under the Commerce Clause
Because Congress enacted the Sherman Act pursuant to its
power to regulate interstate commerce, 9 an examination of the
scope of Congress' commerce power is appropriate. The commerce clause specifically grants Congress jurisdiction over interstate commerce.' 0 The necessary and proper clause of article I
grants Congress implied jurisdiction over any activity substantially
affecting interstate commerce. 1 ' The commerce clause and the necessary and proper clause are the bases of Congress' "commerce
power."12
Courts have construed "interstate commerce" jurisdiction liberally. ' 3 If the activity is in interstate commerce or affects interstate
Cir. 1983); James R. Snyder Co. v. Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., 677 F.2d 111I,
1115 n.3 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1015 (1982); 2) extensive discussion of the split,
followed by a holding that the impact of the defendant's activities is not determinable at the
pretrial stage, i.e., it is a question of fact dependent on "scrutiny of the proof that may be
offered," Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, 713 F.2d 1272, 1282 (7th Cir.
1983); and, 3) ignoring the dispute, wording the test ambiguously enough to satisfy either
interpretation, United States v. Georgia Waste Sys., 731 F.2d 1580, 1583 (11 th Cir. 1984);
Alabama Homeowners, Inc. v. Findahome Corp., 640 F.2d 670, 673-74 (5th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Central State Bank, 564 F. Supp. 1478, 1480 (W.D. Mich. 1983); Bartleys
Town & Country Shops v. Dillingham Corp., 530 F. Supp. 499 (D. Hawaii 1982).
9 See McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 241 (1980); Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975);
United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954); United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949); American Tobacco Co. v. United
States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940);
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1939). See also E. KINTNER, supra note 1, at 24448 (1980).
10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
11 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; McCulloch v. Marylarnd, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819);
ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER:

FEDERAL AND STATE

95 (1974).

13 See ENGDAHL, supra note 12, at 95. The full extent of the commerce power probably
cannot be reduced to rules or tests. Changing circumstances and economic realities require
adapting commerce power jurisdiction to the times. 444 U.S. at 241.
Where Congress finds that a "class of activities" affects interstate commerce, the courts
presume jurisdiction. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971). Where Congress'
interstate regulation is affected by intrastate activity, the courts find jurisdiction. Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Where the instrumentalities of commerce are affected, the
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commerce, Congress has jurisdiction over the activity.1 4 Theoretically, if an activity is wholly intrastate and does not affect interstate
commerce, the commerce power is not triggered and Congress has
no authority to act. Nevertheless, a court may find that such an
activity falls within the "class of activities" that, according to Congress, affects interstate commerce per se. In this situation, the
courts generally defer to Congress'judgment and hold that the specific activity is within Congress' commerce power. 15
Because Sherman Act jurisdiction is coextensive with the commerce power,' 6 the Supreme Court has held that all activities recourts find jurisdiction. Katzenbach v. McLung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); United States v.
Cargo Serv. Stations, 657 F.2d 676, 679-80 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017
(1982); United States v. Azzarelli Constr. Co., 617 F.2d 292, 296-97 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 447 U.S. 920 (1980). In essence, the courts find that "when national interests are at
stake, seemingly local and wholly intrastate activities. . . fall within the sweep of the commerce power." Chatham Condominium Ass'n v. Century Village, Inc., 597 F.2d 1002,
1006 (5th Cir. 1979). The commerce power is "as broad as the need that evokes it." Carter
v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 328 (1936) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
The question of what need evokes the jurisdiction is quite important in any case in
which the jurisdiction is challenged. As indicated in note 16 infra, civil rights and other
regulatory areas are given considerably greater jurisdictional leeway than that given the
Sherman Act. Apparently, the need to alleviate civil rights violations is greater than the
need to address restraints of trade. Arguably, the Sherman Act should not be given wide
jurisdictional latitude because to do so would overload the federal courts with complex and
time-consuming antitrust litigation. See Comment, FederalAntitrustJurisdiction,supra note 5, at
168-69. Others argue that the state antitrust laws are quite sufficient to handle intrastate
violations and that overreaching through the Sherman Act emasculates those state antitrust
laws. See McLain v. Real Estate Bd. 583 F.2d 1315, 1324-25 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 444 U.S. 232 (1980); Note, McLain, supra note 5, at 169 (1980); Comment Federal
Antitrust Jurisdiction,supra note 5, at 172.
Yet another reason for restricting Sherman Act jurisdiction is the courts' wish to use
the jurisdictional requirement to dispose of cases they feel are not meritorious. See P.
AREEDA, supra note 5,
232.1, at 97-99; see, e.g., Hayden v. Bracy, 744 F.2d 1338 (8th Cir.
1983); Furlong v. Long Island College Hosp., 710 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1983); Cordova &
Simonpietri Ins. Agency v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 649 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1981); Alabama
Homeowners, Inc. v. Findahome Corp., 640 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Note, Hospital
Staff, supra note 5.
See also Women's Sportswear, 336 U.S. at 464 ("The source of the restraint may be intrastate

. . .

the application of the restraint may be intrastate

. . .

but neither matters if the

necessary effect is to stifle or restrain commerce among the states. If it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which applies the
squeeze.").
14 See Katzenbach v. McLung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S.
533 (1944); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Houston, E. & W. T. Ry. v. United
States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
15 Perez v. United States, 410 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) (the "class of activities" test). See
also note 13 supra.
16 Although the Sherman Act is often held to be coextensive with the commerce power,
see, e.g., California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 111
(1980); Cardio-Medical Assocs. v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 721 F.2d 68, 73-74 (3d
Cir. 1983); Greenhaw v. Lubbock County Beverage Ass'n, 721 F.2d 1019, 1031 (5th Cir.
1983); Chatham Condominium Ass'n v. Century Village, Inc., 597 F.2d 1002, 1008 (5th
Cir. 1979); Thornhill Pub. Co. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 736 (9th Cir. 1979), this claim
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straining trade, that either are in interstate commerce or affect
interstate commerce, are within Sherman Act jurisdiction. 1 7 But
how the courts are to determine whether a given activity affects interstate commerce remains problematic.
II.

The "Affects" Test under McLain

A controversial jurisdictional issue which arises under the
Sherman Act is whether interstate commerce is affected by the activity in question.' 8 Using the "affects" test, otherwise intrastate activity falls within the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act. In applying the
"affects" test, courts have reached different results on the question
of exactly which activity need affect interstate commerce in order to
establish jurisdiction over the challenged conduct.
is not completely true. First, a different level of liberality in commerce power restraints is
applied to some regulatory activities than to others. See Furgeson, The Commerce Test for
Jurisdiction Under the Sherman Act, 12 Hous. L. REV. 1052 (1975); Note, Portraitof the Sherman
Act as a Commerce Clause Statute, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323 (1974) (a more rigorous standard is
applied to Sherman Act than to civil rights acts). Second, the full extent of the commerce

power includes the "class of activities" jurisdiction. See note 15 supra and accompanying
text. Because the "class of activities" test has never been applied to the Sherman Act, its
jurisdiction may not be as broad as the commerce power. This is unfortunate because the
"class of activities" test more efficiently dispatches with jurisdictional challenges. The
"class of activities" test could be.applied to the Sherman Act by allowing a strong presumption ofjurisdiction over any "class of activities" that is per se violative of the Sherman Act.

But cf. McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 583 F.2d 1315, 1320 (5th Cir. 1978) (no presumption of
jurisdiction for per se violations), rev'd on other grounds, 444 U.S. 232 (1980). Only particularly egregrious violations, horizontal price-fixing, vertical price maintenance, horizontal
market allocation, group boycotts, and tying arrangements are per se violations of Sherman

§ 1. See E. KINTNER, supra note 1, at 362-70. So one could presume that Congress finds
such activities as a class to affect interstate commerce. This or some other creative way of
applying the "class of activities" test seems constitutionally permissible and appears proper
on the policy grounds of maximizing legitimate Sherman Act jurisdiction, reducing legal
costs, and relieving the courts of unnecessary, involved analyses of "affects." One could
argue that the courts should not utilize this "class of activities" approach because that approach would extend Sherman Act jurisdiction to purely intrastate conduct merely on the
basis that the aggregate, or class, of such activities do affect interstate commerce. But this
argument misses the point. This argument is attacking the "class of activities" test in theory, and does not show why it is inapplicable as applied to the Sherman Act. The Supreme
Court used the "class of activities" approach to test commerce power jurisdiction. Short of
overruling Perez, the real question is whether the "class of activities" is inapplicable as applied to the Sherman Act or whether Sherman Act jurisdiction is truly coextensive with the
commerce power so long as this entire area of jurisdiction is ignored.
17 See notes 5, 7, 14 supra. For interesting histories ofjurisdiction under the Sherman
Act, see Eiger, The Commerce Element in FederalAntitrust Litigation, 25 FED. BRJ. 282 (1965);
Furgeson, supra note 16; Kallis, Local Conduct and the Sherman Act, 1959 DUKE L.J. 236; Note,
Hospital Staff, supra note 5, at 121; Note, Antitrust: Application of the Sherman Act to Local Real
Estate Brokerage Activities McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc., 29 DE PAUL L.
REV. 1063 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Antitrust]; Note, Portraitof the Sherman Act as a
Commerce Clause Statute, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323 (1974); Comment, ExpandingFederalAntitrust

Jurisdiction: A Close Look at McLain v. Real Estate Board, Inc., 19 HoUs. L. REV. 143 (1981).
18 See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219
(1948); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Houston, E. & W. T. Ry. v. United States,
234 U.S. 342 (1914).
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In McLain v. Real Estate Board,1 9 the Supreme Court attempted
to resolve the question. In McLain, the New Orleans Real Estate
Board set a minimum brokerage commission rate for Louisiana
brokers. 20 These brokers were licensed only in Louisiana, and
brought buyers and sellers together concerning purchases of property located solely in Louisiana. 2 1 But much of the financing and
many buyers came from out-of-state.2 2 The plaintiffs, purchasers of
real estate, claimed the Real Estate Board was illegally fixing prices.
The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. 2 3 The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal based on the lack of subject mat24
ter jurisdiction.
On review, the Supreme Court held that both lower courts had
applied the "affects" test improperly. 25 Attempting to clarify the
"affects" test, the Court determined that for the federal courts to
have jurisdiction some definite, identified, activity of the defendant
must have a causal nexus with interstate commerce. 26 In addition,
the Court wished to extend the Sherman Act's jurisdiction to the
27
limits of the commerce power.
Applying the "affects" test, the Court held that the plaintiffs
did not have to show that the allegedly illegal activity itself, the fixing of commission rates, affected interstate commerce. 28 Rather,
"it would be sufficient for petitioners to demonstrate a substantial
19 444 U.S. 232 (1980)
20 Id. at 235-36.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 237-38.
23 Id. at 240-41. The trial court stated that (1) the interstate commerce requirement
was a substantive rather than a jurisdictional requirement, and (2) the plaintiffs failed to
show the required interstate nexus because, unlike Goldfarb, see note 14 supra, the realtor
activity was only an incidental rather than an integral part of an interstate transaction; and
therefore, the realtors failed to meet the "necessary and integral" part test, as set out in
Goldfarb.
24 583 F.2d 1315, 1319, 1324 (5th Cir. 1978). The court stated that (1) the interstate
commerce requirement was jurisdictional, (2) the trial court had correctly applied Goldfarb,
and (3) that per se violations of the Sherman Act do not merit a reduced jurisdictional
threshold. Thus, the court concluded that it lacked the power to hear the case on the
merits.
25 444 U.S. at 244-45. Their application was improper because they applied Goldfarb,
an "in" commerce test to the "affects" commerce question. The lower courts' error is
understandable. Goldfarb's language is ambiguous and does not reflect the difference between the "in" and "affecting" commerce tests. Rather, the Court mixed the two tests. In
Goldfarb, 421 U.S. 773, 784, the Court stated: "Thus a title examination is an integral part
of an interstate transaction." The Court also noted: "Given the substantialvolume of commerce involved, and the inseparability of the particular legal service from the interstate
aspects of real estate transactions, we conclude that interstate commerce has been sufficiently affected." Id. at 785. (emphasis added).
26 444 U.S. at 242, 246.
27 Id. at 242-43.
28 Id.
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effect on interstate commerce generated by respondents' brokerage activ29
The Court did not clarify the meaning of "respondents'
brokerage activity." The phrase could refer to: 1) defendants' general business, including a brokerage operation; 2) defendants' illegal activity of fixing commission rates for its brokerage activities;
3) defendants' brokering sales which were infected by the price fixing; or 4) defendants' particular enterprise of conducting a brokerage operation. The Supreme Court's ambiguous statement has led
to four different interpretations in the lower courts: the "general
business activity," "challenged activity," "infected activity," and
"particular enterprise activity" tests.
The "general business activity" test, enunciated by the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Western Waste Service Systems v.
Universal Waste Control,3 0 provides that it is "not necessary for the
alleged antitrust violations complained of to have affected interstate
commerce as long as defendant's business activities, independent of the violations, affected interstate commerce." 3 1 Under this test, jurisdiction exists whenever the defendant is engaged in some activity that
substantially affects interstate commerce, even if that activity is
wholly divorced from the alleged antitrust violation. Thus, if an interstate conglomerate is named as a defendant for an alleged antitrust violation engaged in by a small wholly intrastate subsidiary,
the court would have jurisdiction because the conglomerate's actions substantially affect interstate commerce, even though the restraint had no such impact.3 2 Also, if a business affected interstate
trade through one aspect of its activites, the court would have jurisdiction regardless of whether or not the aspect of its activities that
allegedly restrain trade affects interstate commerce.
Under the "challenged activity" test, the Court of Appeals for
ity."

29 Id. at 243 (emphasis added).
30 616 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir.) (A garbage collection business in Phoenix, Arizona, which
was a wholly owned subsidiary of a Delaware corporation and which purchased machinery

from out-of-state, was within the court's jurisdiction under the Sherman Act.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 869 (1980). While the following cases stated that they were using the "general
business activity" test, the analysis in these cases often appears to follow the "particular
enterprise" approach rather than the "general business activity" approach: Construction
Aggregate Transp. v. Florida Rock Indus., 710 F.2d 752 (Ilth Cir. 1983); Miller v. Indiana
Hosp., 562 F. Supp. 1259, 1284-85 n.81 (W.D. Penn. 1983);Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp.
356, 378 (D. Ariz. 1983). See also Note, McLain, supra note 5, at 166; Note, Commerce Test,
supra note 5, at 714 (should use general business activity test for jurisdictional challenges
and illegal activity test for challenges under 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim).
31 616 F.2d at 1097 (emphasis added).
32 See, e.g., Cordova & Simonpietri Ins. Agency v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 649 F.2d 36,
45 (1st Cir. 1981); Crane v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 637 F.2d 715, 723 (10th Cir.
1980); Comment, FederalAntitrust Jurisdiction,supra note 5, at 167-68 (general business activity test would cover nearly every business relationship-"out-of-state purchases, financing,
or corporate relationships").
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the Tenth Circuit, in Crane v. IntermountainHealth Care, Inc. ,3 interpreted McLain to mean that the plaintiff must show that the allegedly illegal activity itself had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. 34 The application of this test apparently conflicts with
McLain's holding that the challenged activity test was too narrow
because such a test would require the plaintiff to show that the alleged restraint actually had its intended anticompetitive effect. 3 5
The Tenth Circuit concluded, however, that McLain's statement, "a
plaintiff need not 'make the. . . particularized showing,' "36 meant
37
only that an elaborate sufficiency analysis need not be made.
Under the Tenth Circuit's approach, the court would have jurisdic33 637 F.2d 715 (10th Cir. 1980).
34 637 F.2d at 723. See also Hayden v. Bracy, 744 F.2d 1338, 1343 n.2 (8th Cir. 1984);
Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 577 F. Supp. 1273, 1276-77 (M.D. Tenn. 1983). See
Comment, FederalAntitrustJurisdiction,supra note 5, at 712 (wording of Sherman Act prohibits restraints of interstate trade, not restraints of trade engaged in by interstate traders); P.
AREEDA, supra note 5,
232.1, at 94-95.
Two objections to the illegal activity test were alluded to in McLain. First, that test fails
to accord jurisdiction to a significant area of substantive violations of the Sherman Act. The
Act prohibits more than just actual restraints on interstate trade; it also prohibits conspiracies and combinations that have the purpose of restraining such trade-even if the conspiracy or combination is unsuccessful or still nascent when brought to the court's attention.
Given the illegal activity test, a court would never have jurisdiction over an unsuccessful or
incomplete conspiracy, because such a conspiracy would never have had a chance to enter
or affect the stream of commerce.
If establishing jurisdiction required a showing that the unlawful conduct itself had
an effect on interstate commerce, jurisdiction would be defeated by a demonstration that the alleged restraint failed to have its intended anticompetitive effect.
This is not the rule of our cases. A violation may still be found in such circumstances because. . . liability may be established by proof of either an unlawful purpose or an anticompetitive effect.
444 U.S. at 243 (citations omitted; emphasis in original). See also American Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946) ("A combination may be one in restraint of interstate trade or commerce. . . in violation of the Sherman Act, although such restraint or
monopoly may not have been actually attempted to any harmful extent."); United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-25 n.59 (1940) ("It is the 'contract, combination. . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce' which § I of the Act strikes down,
whether the concerted activity be wholly nascent or abortive on the one hand, or successful
on the other.").
Second, the illegal activities test, and the infected activity test, to a lesser extent, require too particularized a showing. 444 U.S. at 242-43. Requiring a plaintiff to make a
particularized showing of market effect by a given restraint or targeted sale would be fundamentally unfair to the plaintiff because of the unnecessary expense and duplicative effort
involved in such a showing. See note 71 infra. What is too particularized can only be determined by showing the proper breadth of the commerce power, see note 3 supra, for any
limitation on the Act's jurisdiction not equally applicable to the commerce power itself, is
an unwarranted limitation, or "too particularized a showing." See also Chatham Condominium Ass'n v. Century Village, Inc., 597 F.2d 1002, 1008 (5th Cir. 1979) ("[A]ny challenge
to subject matterjurisdiction in a Sherman Act case is necessarily resolved by answering the
following question: Can Congress prohibit the challenged conduct under the Commerce
Clause?").
35 444 U.S. at 242-43.
36 637 F.2d at 723 (quoting McLain, 444 U.S. at 242-43).
37 Id.
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tion only if the conspiracy, restraint, or combination in question
did, in fact, substantially affect interstate commerce.
The "infected activity" test, announced first by the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit in Cordova & Simonpietri InsuranceAgency
Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 38 has enjoyed more support than the
other tests. 39 This test requires that the defendant's activity that
allegedly utilized or, if the conspiracy never came to fruition, would
have utilized the illegal activity, must have affected interstate commerce substantially. 40 Thus, if a business "unsuccessfully" conspires to restrain trade on the sales of goods or services, the sales of
those goods or services involved in the failed conspiracy must have
affected interstate commerce to establish jurisdiction.
The fourth interpretation of McLain is the "particular enterprise" test.4 1 The Ninth Circuit, 4 2 in Parks v. Watson4 3 and Turf Par38 649 F.2d 36, 45 (1st Cir. 1981).
39 See Furlong v. Long Island College Hosp., 710 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1983); Palmer v.
Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1981); Note, Antitrust, supra note
17, at 1063.
40 649 F.2d at 45.
41 Functionally, the "particular enterprise" test has been applied in Parks v. Watson,
716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1983); Turf Paradise, Inc. v. Arizona Downs, 670 F.2d 813 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1011 (1982); Feldman v. Jackson Memorial Hosp., 571 F. Supp. 1000
(S.D. Fla. 1983); United States v. H & M, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 651 (M.D. Penn. 1983). This
test has never been expressly discussed with the other three approaches, but has been utilized on a case by case basis. Apparently these courts felt the "defendant's conduct" approach was archaic, see note 46 infra and accompanying text, yet feared the "general
business activity" test was much too broad. See, e.g., Parks, 716 F.2d at 661 (As a city, defendant obviously affected interstate commerce through its general business activity; however, plaintiff had to establish that the city's particular enterprise of establishing a
geothermal heating district affected interstate commerce.); Tur, 670 F.2d at 818-19 ("To
meet the 'effect on commerce' test, Turf need only allege that the local activity of horseracing has a substantial effect on interstate commerce." Jurisdiction was based on the fact that
the enterprise of operating a horseracing track affected interstate commerce.); Feldman, 571
F. Supp. at 1006 n.10 ("[T]he defendants' activity of providing medical care to patients...
must be connected with interstate commerce."); H &M, 562 F. Supp. at 656-68 (the enterprise of paving roads must affect interstate commerce.).
42 Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit has utilized three of the four interpretations since the
Supreme Court decided M1cLain in 1980. In Western Waste Serv. Sys. v. Universal Waste
Control, 616 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980), the Ninth Circuit created
the "general business activity" test. They abandoned that test in Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake
Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1291 (9th Cir. 1981), in favor of the "infected activity"
test. In Hahn v. Oregon Physicians Serv., 689 F.2d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 3115 (1983), they appeared uncertain as to which activity should be considered the
relevant activity. They resolved that "defendants' relevant insurance activities" had to affect interstate commerce. This fact-specific finding seems to have been the beginning of
the Ninth Circuit's transition from the "infected activity" test to the "particular enterprise"
test. The Ninth Circuit now appears to utilize a particular enterprise interpretation. See
Parks, 716 F.2d 646; Turf, 670 F.2d 813 ("Turf need only allege that the local activity of
horseracing" affects interstate commerce.); Bain v. Henderson, 621 F.2d 959, 961 n.2
(9th Cir. 1980) ("[W]e must examine defendants' preparation of the attorney selection list
generally and determine whether this activity has any impact on interstate commerce.").
43 716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1983).
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adise, Inc. v. Arizona Downs,4 4 utilized this approach. Although
difficult to formulate, this approach analyzes the general activities
of the particular enterprise through which the defendant is engaging in the illegal activity. Thus, if a subsidiary of a conglomerate
engages in an anticompetitive combination regarding the wholly intrastate sales of goods or services, the courts need only connect the
45
subsidiary entity to interstate commerce.
To illustrate the different results which courts could reach
under these varying tests, assume that an interstate bank owns a
small insurance company that combined to restrain trade. Assume
further that the attempted restraint was unsuccessful. Because the
bank that owns the insurer affects interstate commerce, the court
would automatically have jurisdiction under the "general business
activity" test. Because the restraint failed, the combination could
not have affected interstate commerce. The court would therefore
not have jurisdiction under the "challenged activity" test. Applying
the "infected activity" test, the court would have jurisdiction only if
the plaintiff could show that the sale of the insurance that was the
object of the restraint on trade affected interstate commerce.
Lastly, the court would establish jurisdiction under the "particular
enterprise" test if the defendant's particular insurance business affected interstate commerce.
IV.

Suggested Solution: The Particular Enterprise Test

In general, the four tests fall within two different approaches:
the "defendant's entity" approach and the "defendant's conduct"
approach. 4 6 The "general business activity" and the "particular en44 670 F.2d 813 (9th Cir. 1982).
45 A recent Supreme Court decision, Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,
104 S.Ct. 2731 (1984), has negative implications for dividing the particular enterprise's
activity from those of the conglomerate business. Copperweld held for the first time that, as a
rule, subsidiaries were incapable of conspiring with their parent corporation, for the subsidiary. as a matter of economic reality, does not have the requisite independence to be considered anything more than a part of the parent corporation. If this is the case, one could
analogize Sherman Act conspiracy law to Sherman Act jurisdictional law and argue that in
reality the illegal acts of the subsidiary are the illegal acts of its parent. Then, one should
look not only to the effects of the particular enterprise, but also to those of the entire business. when checking for a jurisdictional nexus with interstate commerce. But, such an analogy would not be on point. The purpose of looking at only the particular enterprise's
activities and not to those of the general business is not to recognize their separate legal
existence-that would clearly violate the policy of Copperweld. Rather, the purpose is to
recognize the degree of effect the two qualitatively and quantitatively different attenuations
of the effect have on interstate commerce as derived from the illegal conduct. See notes 7173 infra and aicompanying text.
46 This distinction between the defendant's "entity approach" and defendant's "conduct approach" has received little attention; however, the differences can create varying
results. See, e.g., The Employer Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 488-89 (1908) (while the
defendant entity was extensively involved in interstate commerce, the regulated conduct
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terprise" tests share the "defendant's entity" approach which emphasizes that only the defendant need have some general nexus
with interstate commerce to establish jurisdiction. The "challenged
activity" and the "infected activity" test share the "defendant's conduct" approach. To establish jurisdiction under the "defendant's
conduct" approach, some identified conduct of the defendant must
be involved in some way in an allegedly unlawful restraint of trade
having a nexus with interstate commerce. Between these two general approaches, the "defendant's entity" approach best maximizes
Sherman Act jurisdiction while keeping that jurisdiction within constitutional limits. Furthermore, of the two tests which constitute
the "defendant's entity" approach, the "particular enterprise" test
best reflects the constitutionally permissible limit to Sherman Act
jurisdiction under the "affects" test.
The "defendant's entity" approach is superior to the "defendant's conduct" approach due to economic realities. 4 7 In order to
discover the danger the defendant poses to interstate commerce,
courts should examine a defendant's activities and their effects as a
was intrastate in nature); Page v. Work, 290 F.2d 323, 330 (9th Cir.) ("The test ofjurisdiction is not that the acts complained of affect a business engaged in interstate commerce, but
that the conduct complained of affects the interstate commerce of such a business."), cert.
denied, 368 U.S 875 (1961); Chambers Dev. Co. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 590 F. Supp.
1528, 1535 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (In a RICO case, only the entity enterprise, not the predicate
acts of racketeering, need affect interstate commerce.) (citing United States v. Nerone, 563
F.2d 836, 852-54 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978); United States v. Rone,
598 F.2d 564, 573 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980)). See also P. AREEDA,
supra note 5,

232.1 at 94-95; Comment, Federal AntitrustJurisdiction, supra note 5, at 172

(wording of Sherman prohibits conspiracies or combinations " 'in restraint of trade or commerce among the states,' and not anticompetitive acts affecting local businesses which generate some interstate commerce."). Compare Note, Hospital Staff, supra note 5, at 134
(Because the commerce power is coextensive with Sherman Act and the aggregation of all
hospital staff activities affect interstate commerce, the general business activities of the hospital should therefore be within the scope of the Sherman Act.). This analysis overlooks the
fact that conduct, not entities, are regulated. Such an analysis must first show that the
conduct has some direct or indirect nexus with interstate commerce. See also Houston, E. &
W. T. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 353-54 (1914) (the Shreveport case) ("This is not to
say that Congress possesses the authority to regulate the internal commerce of a state, as
such, but that it does possess the power to foster and protect interstate commerce and to
take all measures necessary or appropriate to that end, although intrastate transactionsof interstate carriersmay thereby be controlled. It is immaterial, so far as the protecting power of Con-

gress is concerned, that the discrimination arises from intrastate rates as compared with
interstate rates.") (emphasis added). But see Kissam, Weber, Biggus & Holzgraefe, Antitrust
and Hospital Priviledges: Testing the Conventional Wisdom, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 632-33 (1982)

(rejects the wider approach, blaming the dispute between the McLain interpretations on
"casual dicta at worst or simply an inadvertant expression that has been wrongly torn from
its context by other lawyers and judges.").
47 McLain, 444 U.S. at 241 ("During the near century of Sherman Act experience,
forms and modes of business and commerce have changed along with changes in communication and travel, and innovations in methods of conducting particular businesses have altered relationships in commerce. Application of the Act reflects an adaptation to these
changing circumstances.").
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whole, rather than as isolated conduct.48 Indeed, the McLain Court

emphasized that courts should look to economic reality when testing whether jurisdiction exists. 49 Economic reality, not rigid for-

malism, determines which activities affect interstate commerce; the
Sherman Act is designed to protect interstate competition from all
restraints that affect it.
Early Supreme Court precedent created the principle that an
entity which puts its goods or services in the flow of interstate commerce, or an entity that affects interstate commerce, subjects itself
.to regulations pursuant to the commerce power but only with regard to conduct that either is in interstate commerce or affects interstate commerce. The entity would therefore not be subject to
regulation regarding conduct unrelated to interstate commerce. 50
This principle seems to have been the basis of Crane's51 rejection of
the "defendant's entity" approach. The court stated that general
business activity "is not a sufficient condition because even though
the defendant's entire business may greatly affect interstate commerce, the challenged activity may in every practical economic
sense be unrelated to interstate commerce." 52 Thus, according to
those courts which reject the "defendant's entity" approach, the
regulated or challenged conduct must come under the court's subject matter jurisdiction, not merely the defendant as an entity.
But this principle developed at a time when the Supreme Court
53
drew distinct lines between interstate and intrastate commerce.
Modern economic reality shows that a business' conduct cannot be
divided into that which does and does not affect interstate commerce. 54 The intrastate activites of a business which affects interstate commerce invariably benefit or harm the interstate commerce
which is affected by the other non-infected activities of the defendant. In reality, the "intrastate" activities of such a defendant have
48 Id. See also 444 U.S. at 246 (to establish federal jurisdiction, plaintiffs need only show
that defendant's activities" 'as a matter of practical economics'. . . have a not insubstantial
effect on the interstate commerce involved. . . .Brokerage activities necessarily affect both
the frequency and the terms of residential sales transactions. Ultimately, whatever stimulates or retards the volume of residential sales, or has an impact on the purchase price,
affects the demand for financing and title insurance [which are in interstate commerce].").
49 444 U.S. at 246.
50 See The Employer Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 488-89 (1908) (defendant railway
successfully argued that its employer-employee relations were wholly intrastate in nature
and beyond the purview of the commerce power, despite the fact it was an interstate business in other aspects).
51 See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
52 Crane, 637 F.2d at 723.
53 See Employer, 207 U.S. at 488-89; Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175
U.S. 211 (1899); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). See also note 50 supra.
54 See McLain, 444 U.S. at 246; Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar
Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948); Local 167, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 291
U.S. 293 (1934); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 68-69 (1911).
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an interstate character. A court must look, therefore, to the entity
itself to determine whether interstate commerce is affected by an
intrastate trade restraint. When a business is protected, aided, restrained, or harmed in its intrastate dealings, the effects will also
appear on the interstate market. These effects may appear as
changes in overall competitive strength or in the amount of assets,
or both. 5 5 Therefore, it appears that the Constitution does not require that Sherman Act jurisdiction be based solely on the infected
or illegal activities of the defendant.
In analyzing the issue of Sherman Act jurisdiction, a court must
consider the "channel of commerce" question. 5 6 In determining
whether an activity "affects" interstate commerce, the court must
first determine which channel of commerce is relevant.5 7 If the rel55 444 U.S. at 241; see note 47 supra.
56 The "channel of commerce" is that activity which flows into the "stream of commerce." Although these metaphors are somewhat unclear, the courts have chosen them
because they help explain what are essentially inexplicable concepts. Basically, one must
attempt to trace the defendant's activity to the flow of interstate commerce. If the restraint
is directly in the "stream of commerce," see notes 11-19 supra and accompanying text, then
one need not look to the "channel of commerce." In applying the "affects" test, however,
one must trace the defendant's conduct to that activity which is affected by such conduct
and which affects the flow of commerce by entering into an interstate transaction. Thus,
one is trying to identify which stream of commerce is affected and how.
Although this difficulty is not given its full due, it has received some attention by the
courts. "[T]he crucial issue is whether the 'relevant channel of interstate commerce' requirement. . . relates to plaintiffs or defendant's activities, or both." Cardio-Medical Assocs. v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 536 F. Supp. 1065, 1076 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd, 721
F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1983) (only plaintiffs channel is relevant). The courts have taken three
approaches: (1) that only the plaintiffs channel of commerce is relevant, 536 F. Supp. at
1076; Nara v. American Dental Ass'n, 526 F. Supp. 452 (W.D. Mich. 1981); Western Waste
Serv. Sys. v. Universal Waste Control, 616 F.2d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir.) (Claiborne, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980); (2) that only the defendant's channel is relevant,
Western Waste, 616 F.2d at 1097 n.2; and (3) that both parties' channels are relevant.
Cardio-Medical Assocs. Ltd. v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 721 F.2d 68, 72-74 (3d Cir.
1983); Furlong v. Long Island College Hosp., 710 F.2d 922, 926 (2d Cir. 1983); Construction Aggregate Transp. v. Florida Rock Indus., 710 F.2d 752, 767 n.31 (11 th Cir. 1983).
The weight of opinion and of logic seems to have made this issue moot. There really is no
constitutional reason for limiting the "affects" commerce test to either just plaintiffs or just
defendant's channel of commerce; see Note, Hospital Staff, supra note 5, at 138-39.
McLain suggests a more important reason for analyzing the relevant channel of commerce. See 444 U.S. at 242; note 57 infra;see also Hahn v. Oregon Physicians Serv., 689 F.2d
840, 844 (9th Cir. 1982).
57 Although the cases demonstrate the breadth of Sherman Act prohibitions, jurisdiction may not be invoked under that statute unless the relevant aspect of interstate commerce is identified; it is not sufficient merely to rely on identification of a
relevant local activity and to presume an interrelationship with some unspecified
aspect of interstate commerce. To establish jurisdiction a plaintiff must allege the
critical relationship in the pleadings and if these allegations are controverted must
proceed to demonstrate . . . either that the defendants' activity is itself in interstate commerce or, ifit is local in nature, that it has an effect on some other appreciable activity demonstrably in interstate commerce.
McLain, 444 U.S. at 242. Thus, one reason to concentrate on the relevant channel of commerce is ease of analysis. Indeed, a further concentration on the channels of interstate
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evant channel of commerce is the plaintiffs, the jurisdictional issue
is easily resolved. If the defendant's conduct harms the plaintiff's
ability to operate in its intrastate market, that injury will be felt
quickly and noticeably in plaintiff's interstate connections (such as a
loss of ability to purchase out-of-state machinery). 5 8 However, if
the relevant channel of interstate commerce is the defendant's, the
effects are indirect and less noticeable. Yet, in terms of "practical
economics, ' 59 the "critical relationship" 60 between the alleged illegality and the defendant's interstate-affecting enterprise is the
same. If the defendant is restraining commerce as charged, then
that restraint is protecting, or shoring up, its business. If the defendant's particular enterprise affects interstate commerce, and that
enterprise is protected from intrastate competition through improper trade restraints, then that enterprise can use the unlawfully
obtained proceeds from the restraint in its interstate commerce ac6
tivities. Thus, this activity will "affect" interstate commerce. '
Under the broader "defendant's entity" approach, the allegedly illegal conduct is still the basis for Sherman Act jurisdiction.
However, it is the basis only insofar as the illegal conduct runs
through the related and unrelatedaspects of the defendant's activities
and on to affect commerce. Thus, the defendant's entity approach
to jurisdiction merely recognizes tacitly the deeper effects of an ille62
gal restraint, as a matter of practical economics.
In addition to addressing the modern economic realities, emphasizing the defendant-entity's effects on interstate commerce also
promotes the Sherman Act's policy of protecting competition. The
antitrust laws were designed not to protect the individual competitor, but rather to protect the integrity of the competitive process for
the benefit of the consumer. 6 3 If courts 'require, as a jurisdictional
basis, that the defendant's conduct which is actually in issue must
commerce could replace the present emphasis of tracing the effect backward, from the restraint to commerce, that is evident in the various interpretations of McLain. Rather, by
tracing the line of commerce down to the effect of the restraint the courts would clarify
their analyses. See also 689 F.2d at 844.
58 Construction Aggregate Transp. v. Florida Rock Indus., 710 F.2d 752 (11th Cir.
1983). See Hahn, 689 F.2d at 844 (it is easy to see the effects of destroying the plaintiff if the
plaintiff's activities affect interstate commerce; however, it is not so easy to see the effects of
strengthening the defendant if only the defendant 'affects interstate commerce).
59 444 U.S. at 246.
60 Id. at 242.
61 Id. at 246; see note 48 supra.
62 444 U.S. at 246.
63 See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984); University Life Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Unimarc Ltd., 699 F.2d 846, 852-53 (7th Cir. 1983); Products Liability Ins. Agency,
v. Crum & Forster Ins. Cos., 682 F.2d 660, 663, 665 (7th Cir. 1982); Quality Auto Body,
Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 660 F.2d 1195, 1203-06 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020
(1982); United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1363-64 (5th Cir. 1980). See
also E. KINTNER, supra note I, at 342 n.8.
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affect interstate commerce, the courts would lose the forest, tree by
tree. 6 4 Insignificant competitors, whose elimination does not affect
interstate commerce, would fall to trade restraints one by one, alof the entire market to be slowly
lowing the integrity
65
compromised.
Thus, the "defendant's entity" approach, emphasizing the nature of the defendant as an entity, better fulfills McLain's policy of
establishing the maximum constitutionally permissible jurisdiction
for the Sherman Act. 6 6 Of the two tests which comprise the "defendant's entity" approach ("particular enterprise" test and "general business activity" test), the "particular enterprise" test better
approaches the constitutional limits of the commerce power that
67
the courts will accept.
Jurisdiction under the commerce power "affects" test requires
substantiality of impact. 68 Although the courts have failed to address how substantial this impact must be, 69 they have never abandoned the requirement. 70 Apparently, courts downplay the
64 Cf. Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 641 F.2d 1289, 1293-94 (9th Cir.
1981) (the Sherman Act protects small competitors too, regardless of the substantiality of
impact on commerce); Mac Adjustment, Inc. v. General Adjustment Bureau, 597 F.2d 1318,
1321 (10th Cir. 1979) (even if the company is too small to affect commerce substantially, it
is still entitled to Sherman Act protection).
65 See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959) ("Monopoly can
as surely thrive by the elimination of such small businessmen, one at a time, as it can by
driving them out in large groups.").
66 The wider jurisdictional approach brings Sherman Act jurisdiction in line with commerce power jurisdiction. Note, Commerce Test, supra note 5, at 729.
67 In reality, that which the courts are willing to accept as not overreaching determines
the scope ofjurisdiction. Sherman Act jurisdiction is as broad (and therefore as narrow) as
the need that evokes it. See note 13 supra.
68 444 U.S. at 246 ("a not insubstantial effect"); see St. Bernard Gen. Hosp. v. Hospital
Servs. Ass'n, 712 F.2d 978, 984 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2342 (1984); Palmer
v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1291-94 (9th Cir. 1981) ("a not
wholly insubstantiality affect"). But cf. Note, McLain, supra note 5, at 167-68 (argues the
substantiality requirement demands no more than a de minimus impact, but that a plaintiff
must now show an appreciable amount of commerce to be involved, however substantially).
69 One need show only a de minimus effect, not a substantial and adverse effect; see P.
232.1, at 91-92, 95-97. The "shift of commerce" theory arguably
AREEDA, supra note 5,
has stripped the "substantiality" requirement of its content. This theory holds that a plaintiff need not show an increase or decrease in interstate trade, so long as a shift takes place;
see United States v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 750 F.2d 1183 (3d Cir. 1984); Cardio-Medical
Assocs. v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 721 F.2d 68, 72-74 (3d Cir. 1983) (rejected shift
theory); Mishler v. St. Anthony's Hosp. Sys., 694 F.2d 1225, 1227 (10th Cir. 1981); Nurse
Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbet, 577 F. Supp. 1273, 1276-77 (M.D. Tenn. 1983). Or even if
trade is actually increased, see Harold Friedman Inc. v. Thorofare Markets, 587 F.2d 127,
132 (3d Cir. 1978). Further, McLain required an anticompetitive effect orpurpose, 444 U.S.
at 243; thus, one could argue substantiality is becoming less important. See Note, McLain,
supra note 5, at 166.
70 McLain, 444 U.S. at 246. A greater emphasis on the question of substantiality could
replace the current dispute as to which activity should be addressed. Cf. Bunker Ramo
Corp. v. United Business Forms, 713 F.2d 1272, 1282 (7th Cir. 1983); Crane v. Intermountain Health Care, 637 F.2d 715 (10th Cir. 1980). However, such an approach would fall to
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substantiality requirement to avoid a complicated, prolonged, and
duplicative market impact analysis at the pre-trial stage. 71 But the
derivative effect on interstate commerce from an illegal restraint in
a wholly different enterprise that runs through the general business
activities of a conglomerate is de minimus due to the attenuation
between the restraint and the impact on interstate commerce. So,
for the sake of practicality, the jurisdictional standard for determining which activity need affect interstate commerce should be the
"particular enterprise" test which tacitly recognizes the de minimus
72
effect a more derivative activity has on commerce.
The substantiality requirement refers to the relevant activity's
impact. Therefore, one could argue that the de minimus effect argument is deficient in that it fails to recognize the dual purpose of
focusing on the relevant activity. However, the rationale for broadening thejurisidictional tests is based upon modern economic realities. The "defendant's entity" approach tacitly recognizes that the
"illegal activity" infects the defendant's entire entity. The substantiality of the effect of the anticompetitive conduct, however, becomes de minimus because the relationship between the
anticompetitive conduct and interstate commerce becomes further
attentuated as the effect moves up through the corporate chain.
This second tacit recognition makes the "particular enterprise" test
the more constitutionally sound standard.
V. Conclusion
The Constitution limits which activities Congress may regulate.
Congress enacted the Sherman Act under the commerce power of
the Constitution. Only those activities that are in interstate commerce or affect interstate commerce fall under the jurisdiction of
the Sherman Act. The question of which activities affect interstate
commerce has troubled the courts. Attempting to clarify the issue,
the Supreme Court established two requirements for Sherman Act
jurisdiction: (1) that some identified nexus with interstate commerce must be established; and, (2) that the scope of Sherman Act
jurisdiction should be extended and reflect the realities of the modthe problem of inefficiency, see note 71 infra, or would ignore the courts' lack of power to
hear the case without a preliminary finding of jurisdiction and try the jurisdictional and
substantive issues together, see note 5 supra.
71 To require a full-blown analysis of the substantiality of the effect on interstate commerce would require as extensive an analysis at this early stage of determining jurisdiction
as would later be required for the market impact analysis, determining the impact on competition for the case in chief. This would be even more questionable in a case where a per
se violation is charged, see notes 13, 15 infra and accompanying text, because this jurisdictional phase of the trial would require a more thorough analysis than the case in chief where
the market impact would be presumed. See also 444 U.S. at 242-43.
72 See Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n., 472 F.2d 517, 526 (9thCir. 1973).
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ern marketplace. Unfortunately, the Court's attempt to clarify the
jurisdictional standard for the Sherman Act created confusion
among the courts of appeals. Four different tests developed: the
"general business activity," the "challenged activity," the "infected
activity," and the "particular enterprise activity" interpretations.
Of the four interpretations, the "particular enterprise" interpretation of McLain's "affects" test best balances the policy of applying
the Sherman Act to all restraints of trade that affect interstate commerce and the requirement of showing a not wholly insubstantial
effect on interstate commerce caused by some activity with an identified nexus with that commerce. The "particular enterprise" test
best determines the extent of Sherman Act jurisdiction under the
"affects" test.
Jeffrey M. Thompson

